


# *A Guide*


TO ARMY

PHILOSOPHY

p.b.  
U15  
U53  
no20:1-3




HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
1958



U15  
U53  
no. 20:1-3

## **FOREWORD**

This pamphlet has been prepared by the Department of the Army to aid in the dissemination of Army views on current military subjects of professional interest to Army personnel. It is basically a compilation of pertinent extracts from public statements made over this past year by the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff, Army.



**PAMPHLET** }  
**No. 20-1** }

**HEADQUARTERS,**  
**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 22 January 1958**

## **A GUIDE TO ARMY PHILOSOPHY**

---

	<b>Page</b>
<b>SECTION I. National Military Program</b> .....	<b>5</b>
<b>II. Security Through Balanced Deterrence</b> .....	<b>8</b>
<b>III. How Much is Enough</b> .....	<b>15</b>
<b>IV. The Army's Contribution to Deterrence</b> .....	<b>20</b>
<b>V. The Mission of the Army</b> .....	<b>23</b>
<b>VI. Future Land Battle and Its Requirements</b> .....	<b>25</b>
<b>VII. Measured Retaliation and The Versatile Army</b> .....	<b>31</b>
<b>VIII. Manpower</b> .....	<b>33</b>
<b>IX. The Reserve Components</b> .....	<b>38</b>
<b>X. Army Support of Our Allies</b> .....	<b>42</b>
<b>XI. Army Missiles</b> .....	<b>49</b>
<b>XII. The Army Aviation Program of the Future</b> .....	<b>53</b>
<b>XIII. The Army Budget</b> .....	<b>55</b>
<b>XIV. Army Management</b> .....	<b>58</b>
<b>XV. The Civilian and The Serviceman</b> .....	<b>64</b>



# **SECTION I**

## **NATIONAL MILITARY PROGRAM**

### **Objectives of a National Security Program**

The basic objective of U. S. national security policy is to preserve the security of the U. S. and its fundamental values and institutions. In furtherance of the basic objective, the U. S. seeks, by any and all means acceptable to the American people, to alter the international Communist movement to the end that it will no longer constitute a threat to the national security of the U. S. The National Security Program must include national programs in political, diplomatic, military, economic, psychological, and cultural fields which contribute to the stature and prestige of the U. S. and to the attainment of its national objectives. Its central aim is the deterrence of Communist expansion in whatever form it may take. The U. S. must have the political, military, economic, and moral strength sufficient to induce the Communist Bloc to renounce or refrain from all forms of aggression. The evidence of this strength must be so clear as to create in the mind of the enemy the conviction that aggression will not pay.

### **Objectives of the National Military Program**

The National Military Program must be integrated with all the other national programs and have as its basic objective the maintenance of military strength which is capable of dealing with both general war and aggression under conditions short of general war. The military strength of the U. S. and her allies must be so constituted as to prevent war if possible, limit war if it occurs, and successfully defeat any aggression that may threaten the national interest.

### **Elements of the National Military Program**

The elements of a sound National Military Program must include adequate provision for deterrence of general war, deterrence of local aggression, defeat of local aggression, and victory in general war conducive to a viable peace.

The Soviets have the capability of initiating a general war with an atomic onslaught, possibly with little or no warning, against the U. S. Such an onslaught would be accompanied by other coordinated action to gain Soviet objectives on the Eurasian land mass. It is funda-

mental, therefore, that the United States Military Program make provisions for the deterrence of this type of war.

While this all-out atomic war initiated by the Soviets presents a very grave threat, aggression short of general war appears more likely to occur than deliberately initiated general war. In the approaching era of atomic plenty, with resulting mutual deterrence, the Communists will probably be inclined to expand their tactic of subversion and limited aggression. The National Military Program, therefore, must provide for the deterrence of limited aggression, and for the defeat of such aggression if deterrence measures fail. Otherwise, any of the following may result:

- (1) Conflict short of general war may expand into general war.
- (2) Continued gains by the Communist Bloc may erode the moral and material strength of the Free World with consequent loss of the capability to deter local and general war.
- (3) A large part of the Free World may either fall to local aggression or so incline to neutralism as to leave the United States in a virtual state of isolation.
- (4) Repeated success in creeping aggression may encourage a Communist miscalculation that could lead to general war.

The possibility must always be recognized that in spite of all our efforts at deterrence, general war, in which atomic weapons will be used from the outset, may occur and last for an indeterminate period. The U. S., therefore, must be prepared for such an eventuality and the National Military Program must provide for the rapid expansion essential to the successful conduct of general war.

### **Military Requirements of the NMP**

The requirements of a military program developed in consonance with the foregoing are:

- (1) The maintenance of military technological superiority over the Communist Bloc.
- (2) A deterrent, atomic delivery system capable of effective retaliation against an enemy.
- (3) A continental defense system, including both active and passive measures, strong enough to prevent an enemy from delivering a crippling blow to the Continental United States.
- (4) Adequate Army, Navy and Air Force forces deployed abroad to meet our international obligations, and backed by logistic support adequate for sustained combat.
- (5) Ready forces of the Army, Navy, and Air Force capable of intervening rapidly in areas where local aggression may occur. These ready forces should have the capability of employing atomic weapons when and to the extent authorized by



proper authority. The logistical back-up adequate to support these forces in combat should be immediately available.

- (6) Other ready forces of the Army, Navy and Air Force, in being, capable of rapidly reinforcing the forces in (5) above, under conditions short of general war and the forces in (4) above, in the event of general war. These other ready forces should have the capability of employing atomic weapons when and to the extent authorized by proper authority. The logistic arrangements should be capable of supporting these forces in either an atomic or nonatomic local war and in an atomic general war.
- (7) Military and economic aid programs capable of developing indigenous strength and confidence among our allies and of assisting in the deterrence and defeat of Communist aggression.
- (8) Reserve forces in the United States capable of rapid mobilization to:
  - (a) Replace ready forces in (6) above, committed against local aggression.
  - (b) Meet the needs of an atomic general war.
- (9) Stockpiles of equipment for the United States and selected allies necessary to meet the requirements of war until wartime production becomes adequate.
- (10) A war-production, mobilization and training base to support an atomic general war.

## Summary

Fulfillment of foregoing military requirements constitutes a sound National Military Program. It must, as a minimum be capable of deterring war, both general and local, and winning local war quickly. In relying on deterrence we must bear in mind that Communist advances in technology and preparedness may render today's deterrents inadequate to restrain the Soviet Bloc tomorrow.

The National Military Program must be suitable for flexible application to unforeseen situations. It cannot be geared to any single weapons system, strategic concept, or combination of allies. It must be capable of supporting our national policy in all situations. It should attract essential allies and not repel other allies. In short, the military program of the United States should include all reasonable measures to prevent general and local war and at the same time contain the potentiality of waging any war, large or small, in such a manner as to achieve our national objectives and to bring about a better world upon the successful conclusion of hostilities.

## SECTION II

### SECURITY THROUGH BALANCED DETERRENCE

The attainment of national security requires an integrated national strategy which blends in proportion all of our strength—military, economic, political and ideological. To this integrated strategy our military planners must look for general guidance in developing a national military program which can contribute to the goal of national security.

Since there exists a school of thought which considers “national security” as being synonymous with “national safety,” let us draw the distinction before proceeding further. Safety carries a connotation of unqualified absence of danger, which is not compatible with the requirements of living in this uncertain world for which we must provide leadership. It is the vain search for unqualified safety which has led nations to build Chinese walls and Maginot lines. If we are so misguided as to take safety as our objective, we may incline to such actions as withdrawing our troops from overseas, recoiling from our international commitments, and bankrupting ourselves on intercontinental bombers and the air defense of the continental United States. Security, on the other hand, connotes another attitude; it is offensive-minded, whereas safety inclines to the defensive. The one suggests mobility, the other passivity. The one inclines to a forward strategy, the other to the concept of Fortress America. Most important of all, security places faith in the deterrence of war; whereas safety cannot content itself with mere deterrent strength, but seeks the means to live free from harm even if war comes—surely an unattainable goal.

It is submitted that the security which we seek can be obtained through a national military program based on deterrence. Such a military program, to be truly adequate, must be integrated with all other national programs and must have as its basic objective the maintenance of military strength capable of providing the tri-dimensional deterrence which is required. This military strength must be flexible and versatile, that is, capable of adjusting itself to the various military situations which our Nation may be called upon to face. Consequently it should not be geared to any single weapons system, strategic concept or combination of allies, but must be capable of

supporting our national policy in all international situations. It is balanced deterrence which we are seeking.

To be adequate, the national military program must contain properly weighted provision for deterrence of general war, deterrence of local aggression, defeat of local aggression, and survival in general war. This four-pointed program with its relative priorities is fundamental and is based upon the following reasoning.

The primary purpose of all military activities bearing upon security is to prevent atomic war. It is an inescapable fact that such a war would be an irreparable disaster to all participants, that no true victor can emerge from an unlimited general nuclear war. Hence, all of our efforts must be directed toward the prevention of this disaster. It must never be allowed to occur.

Accepting that basic thought, we can then move on to this corollary: As both sides in the bi-polar world accept this fact, it becomes increasingly unlikely that either side will deliberately embark on a war which would end in reciprocal annihilation. However, that does not mean for a moment that Communism will renounce aggression as a tool of policy. Inherent in the nature of the Communist movement is a need for dynamism if it is to continue as a significant world force. Therefore, the threat of subversion and local aggression tends to become the most serious threat to world peace. These forms of attack are particularly dangerous, because the small aggression, if not arrested, may lead to the erosion of the Free World and to our loss, piecemeal, of that which we are pledged to defend. If resisted, it must be defeated promptly, otherwise the smoldering "brush fire" may lead to the general conflagration, to that general atomic war which it is our purpose to avoid. Consequently, immediately after the deterrence of general war, must come the mission of deterring, or winning quickly, any local aggression which may break out about the world. Only after meeting these requirements are we justified in extending our preparations to hedge against the failure of deterrence and to face the disastrous consequences of general atomic war.

Now, a word about deterrence. The deterrent strength which is sought is that combination of force, military, political, and moral, which will produce in the mind of a potential aggressor recognition of the fact that aggression inimical to the interests of the United States will bring unprofitable consequences. The credibility of the probable reaction of the United States is an essential ingredient in producing the desired effect.

This requirement for credibility places a limit on the deterrent effect of our air atomic strength. It appears that this strength is sufficiently impressive and its use sufficiently credible to deter a direct atomic attack on the continental United States. The Soviets are quite con-

vinced that, in the latter case, we would respond at once in kind with devastating effect. This retaliatory capability obviously has not been sufficient, however, to deter local aggression in such places as Greece, Korea, Vietnam and Hungary. The Russians simply do not believe that we will start a global atomic war for anything less than our national survival, and hence have perpetrated many acts of local aggression without concern for our air fleets and atomic bombs. Our deterrent strength must provide a suitable, credible response to aggression under conditions which do not justify a resort to the full employment of our retaliatory nuclear power.

In developing a national military program of balanced deterrence, an important consideration is the extent to which we can count upon using nuclear weapons. In general, we must plan to use atomic weapons from the outset in any general war with the Soviet Union. In situations short of such a war we will use atomic weapons according to our military interests. Under the terms of this latter statement, we can conceive of restrictions on the use of atomic weapons. Such restrictions might conceivably be imposed either by international agreement or by ourselves, guided by the interests of the moment. One thinks readily of Korea where without any formal agreement tacit limitations were imposed by both sides on weapons employed and on the limits of the battlefield. Although we might never fight again as we did in Korea, nonetheless it is easy to conceive of situations where it will be to our interest to apply restrictions as to the nature or location of targets, the size of weapons, the time of employment, or the manner of exploding the weapons—that is, air or surface bursts. Most of our planners are becoming greatly impressed with the dangers to our own forces and to the friendly peoples arising from the wholesale employment of atomic weapons. An adequate military program must be flexible enough to accept the employment of atomic weapons under a variety of conditions and limitations.

Against the foregoing background let us turn to a consideration of the internal composition of a national military program of deterrence designed, in order of priority, to deter general war, to deter or win local war, and finally, to win a general war. What should be the elements of such a program, and where should the emphasis be placed?

Always bearing in mind that our goal is security and not 100 percent safety, at the head of an adequate program must be the maintenance of military technological superiority over the Communist bloc. We cannot long remain secure if we do not have the potentiality of outstripping the enemy in the quality of our weapons systems. Our research and development programs are the means by which we seek to maintain this vital superiority. Their most significant product is the new, com-

plicated and expensive system of weapons which are being translated from blueprints to tangible hardware. In view of the evidence of Soviet progress in this field, we can never afford to be complacent about our own success, brilliant though they often appear. We must never relax our efforts, being sure that the enemy is always doing his best.

In enumerating the "musts" of the national military program, it is hardly necessary to emphasize the requirements for an atomic delivery system, capable of effective and rapid retaliation against any enemy who initiates atomic hostilities. At the present time, this atomic delivery capability resides mainly in the long and medium-range bomber, but it will be reinforced in the course of the coming years by the long-range missiles now under design and development. So obvious is the need for this retaliatory element in our program that we run the danger of considering that it is sufficient in itself for national security; there are too many situations to which a hydrogen bomb is not the appropriate response. We will be deficient in the use of our tremendous potential for guiding this world if our military means of suasion is limited to the ability to blast an adversary from the surface of the earth.

The ability to strike hard and decisively against the sources of enemy strength should be accompanied by a complementary capability to discourage the enemy from believing that by a surprise attack he can destroy our homeland. This requirement makes indispensable a continental defense system, including both active and passive measures sufficient to render doubtful the effectiveness of an atomic surprise. The Continental Air Defense Command, with its Army, Navy, and Air Force components today represents this element of the national military program. A great deal of thought is being given to ways and means of strengthening its effectiveness. There are in this area almost unlimited possibilities for the expenditure of money and resources, and our top military planners are greatly concerned over the ultimate demands of this continental defense system. Here is an area in which an effort to avoid any risk and to be perfectly safe could have disastrous effects on a balanced military program.

A third element in our deterrent system is represented by Army, Navy, and Air Force units deployed abroad, ready for sustained combat in the discharge of our international obligations. These forces deployed along the Iron and Bamboo Curtains are a constant reminder to the Soviet bloc of our determination to defend in place. Their continued presence in Europe and in the Far East indicates to the enemy that a forward movement in those strategically important areas will be countered at once by the military might of the United States. It is true that these forces are not great in number, but

they are sufficient to provide a deterrent reminder and at the same time to maintain the morale and confidence of those countries which live constantly under the Communist guns. Our men in uniform on the streets in Europe and the Far East are a symbol to the local peoples of the willingness of the United States to share the hazards of dangerous living, face to face with the Soviet threat.

But our forces overseas, important as they are to the deterrence of war, are also potential hostages in the event of war. If our deterrent effect fails and the enemy undertakes hostilities overseas, these forces must immediately fight for their lives, as they can expect to be under heavy attack by superior forces from the outset of war. Consequently, we must maintain as a part of our national military program ready forces of the Army, Navy and Air Force capable of reinforcing rapidly the areas where our forces are presently deployed. All of our forces, those deployed and those in reserve, must have the capability of employing atomic weapons in accordance with the requirements of the moment. There must be in existence a logistical back-up available to support both the initial deployments and the follow-up forces for an indefinite period of combat.

But these reinforcements will never leave our shores if we do not have adequate naval and air transport with unimpeded transit of the sea and air. The requirements for overseas reinforcement can present itself in two different situations. The first is that of reinforcing our peacetime deployments in Europe and in the Far East. In addition, we may be faced with the necessity of deploying forces rapidly to meet a local aggression in an area outside the area of our current deployments. This so-called small war or brush-fire requirement rests heavily upon the conscience of the Army. To discharge our responsibilities, the Army must maintain in the United States a strong, mobile, striking force ready at all times for prompt deployment by a combination of air and sea lift to any part of the Soviet periphery where local aggression may occur.

Military and economic aid programs constitute another essential element of a balanced national military program. These aid programs should be closely related to our military requirements, although political considerations cannot be entirely ignored. Generally speaking, we desire one of three levels of military strength in the countries which we assist. As a minimum, we wish all these countries to have the necessary military strength to assure internal stability and order. Beyond this minimum level, we wish in some instances, as in Vietnam, Taiwan, and South Korea, to develop a capability of self-defense against local aggression. Finally, in a rather restricted group of countries, largely those of the NATO bloc, we seek to develop allies

who can make a significant and prolonged contribution in case of general war. It is this indigenous strength which, we hope, will gain us the time necessary to bring up our reinforcements, if our Government decides to engage in direct military operations in support of these areas.

These, then, are the essential elements of our national military program: the atomic delivery system, the continental defense system, our overseas deployments, naval and air forces to control lines of communication, our ready forces to back up these overseas deployments and to meet outbreaks of local aggression, and finally indigenous forces supported by our military and economic aid programs. All of these items constitute visible, tangible strength, which in their totality should create the deterrent impression which is the primary objective of our entire military effort. They represent the indispensable part of the program for which we must find the means to support. What follows represents the hedge against the failure of deterrence. It is hoped that some means will be found to support the hedge, but there should be no doubt as to the priority of effort on the foregoing elements of deterrence.

In any case, it is clearly prudent to make some provision for the failure of deterrence. Through inadequacy of our efforts, or through miscalculation by the enemy, deterrence may fail and local or general war may ensue. We cannot be sure of the duration or ultimate requirements of either kind of war—large or small. There are those who feel that any significant war will be initiated by an atomic attack on D-day, that the first few hours and days will be decisive, and that the aftermath will be only picking up the pieces. Such an atomic attack—if it takes place under these conditions—would indeed entail vast destruction and would preclude an orderly mobilization and the deployment on schedule of large military forces. While we do not contend that this is not a possible course of events, we reject it as the sole concept of future war, and as the exclusive basis for military planning.

Consequently, it would appear wise to have some back-up strength to meet the variations of war which may occur. It is entirely possible that both sides, for fear of retaliation, will restrict the employment of atomic weapons so that there would be little or no damage to our mobilization base at home. We may never fight the big atomic war at all, and find the critical military problem to be the prompt suppression of local aggression. In the latter case, a so-called “conventional” mobilization would proceed undisturbed. Consequently, as an element of our program we must make some provision for reserve forces and their logistical support.

It is believed that if adequate provision is made for the foregoing requirements, we shall have a balanced national military program capable of falling into place in an integrated national strategy. If these requirements are fulfilled, we will have a powerful capability for deterring war, both general and local, and for winning local war quickly. We will also have made reasonable provision for the support of operations if the deterrent fails.



## SECTION III

### HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?

Among the military planners of the Services it is relatively easy to get agreement on the types of forces required to meet the national objective of deterrence of war. It is readily recognized by the Service representatives that this deterrence calls for the existence of a strategic air-retaliatory command, a Continental Air Defense Command, ground forces deployed overseas, a strategic mobile reserve, adequate seagoing forces and continued assistance to our allies. However, it is not sufficient just to enumerate and create the forces required; the allocation of national assets must be made to these type forces. That is when you get your resources laid on the line and must decide where the money and the manpower will go. Although this pamphlet may not offer a complete solution to this problem, it will set forth an approach which it is believed presents a reasonable manner of deciding where our dollars should be spent, or in other words, where the emphasis should fall.

First, let us look at our strategic air retaliatory force. Is there any way to say how much is enough in that important area? Although agreement as to what is enough may prove difficult, it is submitted that it is not at all impossible to evaluate sufficiency in this area or, indeed, in any other military area. The approach to be taken is similar to that which an engineer will take in building a bridge. When he starts the engineer evaluates all the stresses and strains, the winds and the various factors which might affect that bridge. Then he adds them all up to be certain that his material will meet those requirements. Next, he will arrive at a sound factor of safety, such as three, and put it in and say: "That for my money is enough, and I will stake my reputation and that of my company that the bridge will stand." We can take a similar approach to most of our military problems.

It is entirely possible for us—knowing the tremendous destructive power of our present atomic and nuclear weapons, the hazards of delivery, the chances of human error, and other related factors—to determine the necessary equation to destroy the enemy by that particular weapons system. Then, we should be quite willing to multiply that figure by two or three or four, or any other logical factor, and

end up with a computation which we feel would give us a reasonable estimate of adequacy.

Probably the most difficult area in which to reach a formula for sufficiency is in the category of forces for Continental Air Defense. How much should we spend year after year on the chance that we may be attacked by air? Certainly we should spend enough to insure that we have an effective deterrent to a surprise air attack—there is no question about that. In evaluating the hazards of attacking the United States, a potential enemy should have to ask himself what the price in bombers will be. How many will get through? Will they be enough to do the job to the point that he does not have to fear the U. S. anymore? Certainly we must have adequate defenses so that the answer in the enemy's mind should reveal a cost so great that in view of all the other factors which discourage him, he will find no solace in the openness of the skies of the U. S. But, on the other hand, it is quite easy to let air defense requirements snowball to the point where we should defend every hamlet and village in the U. S. with the tremendously expensive air defense weapons which we have. This, is perhaps the most difficult field in which adequacy can be evaluated in terms other than just good common sense. We must have something; we must have considerable. But it would be a great error to overextend ourselves in this purely passive form of military defense.

With respect to the ground deterrence, it is fairly easy to say that insofar as our overseas deployments are concerned, we have about enough. We have five divisions in Europe and two divisions in the Far East. It seems that these forces are enough to encourage our allies to match them in terms of the necessary standard of military readiness and proficiency. We must take care to consider all aspects of the problem when thought is given to reducing this number of divisions. We have already seen the reaction of certain allied leaders to the speculation that there might be a substantial decrease in our overseas deployments.

With regard to our strategic mobile reserve at home, we certainly need to have a substantial number of divisions—four, five, six, something of that order—ready to go, so that the Korean-type war can be met quickly and far more efficiently than we did in the case of Korea. The Communists, in choosing Korea for attack, picked probably the only portion of the earth's surface where we could respond in time. We could respond simply by the proximity of our forces in Japan, unready as they were. It would be folly to gamble on such a situation happening again. Consequently, the maintenance of real readiness on the part of a good hard corps of striking forces

here in the United States is an indispensable part in reaching adequacy in deterrence.

With regard to the requirements of sea deterrence, certainly the growing threat of the Soviet submarine force gives our Navy a fairly good measure of what they might have to face in terms of general war requirements. The sea deterrence requirement for general war is believed to be sufficient because the requirement for conditions short of general war hardly expose us to any threat of the loss of control of the seas.

Turning to the question of how much is enough in helping our allies to build their own deterrent strength, we can only cite what has been done thus far. From 1950 to 1956 the military aid program has amounted to 19 billion dollars, and in the NATO area 12.5 billion dollars of the over-all figure. Certainly, in judging our aid program by hindsight, we perhaps could have done better. But one cannot but be tremendously impressed, as he takes a look at these allies around the world, with their strength-in-being resulting from our military aid program. Today the Army itself is engaged in training or assisting in the training of over 200 foreign divisions. Consequently, sometimes when we say that the enemy has us outnumbered on the ground by such a margin that we could not compete with them, we are wrong. It just is not so. We have substantial strength on the ground, providing we have the desire and will to make use of it.

We have just stepped very briefly through the consideration of how much is enough in allocating our resources to those categories of forces which it is believed are necessarily part of our military program. One or two additional significant facts should be mentioned.

The development of mutual strategic deterrence serves to emphasize the fact that, as general nuclear war becomes less probable, lesser forms of aggression become the more likely means to be used to further communist expansion. But only a small proportion of our budget and our efforts go specifically to meet the threat of conditions short of general war. We should remind ourselves that the Strategic Air Command with all of the supporting forces capable of striking the Soviet Union with an all-out atomic effort is a primary deterrent to general war. However, considering the numerous local wars in the past decade, how much does SAC contribute to conditions *short* of general war?

Let us take our Continental Air Defense. Although it is an extremely important deterrent to general war, not a dollar we spend on it contributes one iota to our ability to react to situations short of general war. Similarly, our deployments overseas are only marginal contributions to conditions short of general war. We can detach

forces from these locations to peripheral areas, but they are not deployed specifically for that job. Similarly, the part of the Navy which is designed to counter the very serious general war threat of the submarine adds little to the requirements for conditions short of general war. It thus appears that only a relatively minor proportion of our military budget can be found to apply specifically and purposely to suppress situations short of general war. When the question is raised as to whether this is a proper allocation of resources, many will ask "Why is this the case?" The answer would seem to lie with a certain doctrine or approach which we can refer to as "the doctrine of the worst possible case". It runs as follows: Since general atomic war is the worst thing that can happen to us, if we prepare for that we should be ready to take care of anything less than that. This would seem to be a bit like the doctor who says: "Since tuberculosis is the worst of all diseases, if I have a medicine that cures tuberculosis, it is a remedy also for the common cold." However, it just does not work out that way. If we prepare only for the worst possible case, we will buy more big bombers, we will buy more big bombs and we will put more into continental defense. Furthermore, here at home we will disperse our people from the cities and go into igloos. We will go underground; we will stockpile great stocks against the losses we anticipate from direct attack. We will do all of these things which will completely channelize our efforts to the point where we are muscle-bound in this one single area of deterrence, and which may still fail to deter the local war, as past experience has proven.

If we follow that line of thinking to its conclusion our allies and friends overseas will find this strategy holding no attractions for them. It invites them to the neutralism which results from the fear of the consequences of our making a fortress out of America and ceasing to interest ourselves in the direct protection of their homeland. In all events, it will be the end of forward strategy and the institution of the concept of "Fortress America".

Implicit throughout the foregoing is the belief that there is an approach which is not astronomical in its financial implications of defending America and the Western World. It is buying and believing in balanced deterrence which has been arrived at by applying the measure of "how much is enough" to the categories of forces necessary to our military program. It is believing that it is important to examine everything we do so that we relate our activities to deterring war with the winning of war. It is believing—and showing our belief by execution—that those things we do, those forces we put into our military structure are aimed primarily at convincing the enemy that direct attack will not pay. Also, it is convincing the enemy that even the

small aggression will be promptly suppressed. Meanwhile, we must convince ourselves that the safety of the world is not at the water's edge of the U. S., but must project ourselves forward in a common alliance to which we contribute according to our means and according to our capacities.

We must never tie our military policy to a single weapon, to a single weapons system, to a single concept of war. Rather, we must maintain flexibility of strength so that we can respond adequately with appropriate means regardless of the challenge presented to us. In so doing we shall be adopting a policy which gives the indispensable strength to our leaders so that they may choose the right response at the right time and at the right place.

## SECTION IV

### THE ARMY'S CONTRIBUTION TO DETERRENCE

A strong, combat-ready Army is an essential part of the deterrent forces needed for our national security. Today's Army has been developed in consonance with the view that its primary purpose is to provide strength for the prevention of war, either large or small. Every element has been scrutinized to determine that it does in fact enhance this capability.

Army forces provide a deterrent to war through overseas deployments covering vital strategic areas, by the existence of ready, mobile forces constituting the Strategic Army Force, by its antiaircraft units assigned to the continental air defense of the United States, by its reserve components, and by the part it plays in training allied forces.

Our divisions deployed overseas serve to remind would-be aggressors that they will be resisted at once by the armed might of the United States. The aggregate strength of indigenous and U. S. Army forces in vital strategic areas such as Western Europe must be sufficient to provide a strong forward shield, capable of repelling either a surprise or deliberate attack by Communist bloc armies. Trip wire or token ground forces for this vital mission will not do. They are needed in significant strength to prevent a forward surge of hostile land forces seeking safety from our atomic weapons by a quick intermingling with our defensive units. They are needed to retain the battlefield and the beaten zone of atomic weapons outside of the friendly lands which we are charged to protect. They must be strong enough in defense to gain us the reaction time needed to ready our retaliatory blows against the enemy. Finally, our land forces deployed overseas are needed in quantity to convince our allies that their defense does not rest exclusively on the use of heavy atomic weapons but provides other less drastic possibilities more appealing to the peoples of our allies.

Not only does the Army contribute to deterrence by its forces abroad, but it maintains at home a strategic reserve of divisions ready to reinforce our overseas deployments if they are attacked. Furthermore, these divisions represent the "fire brigade" which is available for immediate dispatch to any area threatened by aggression. We are keenly

aware of the importance of a prompt reaction under such conditions. We recognize that the small aggression must be resisted promptly and quickly defeated, otherwise it may expand into the general war which we are trying to avoid. Thus, the Army emphasizes the instant readiness of these strategic divisions and it urges the preparation and maintenance of plans for their movement by sea and by air into those areas of the world where their employment seems likely. To the extent that these strategic units of the Army are strong, well-trained and equipped, and obviously ready for trouble, they are an important part of the over-all deterrent strength of our Nation.

Another vital deterrent role which the Army plays is in the area of defense of the continental United States against air attack. Regular Army and National Guard units are on a 24-hour guard around the major cities and centers of this nation. We are constantly seeking to improve the weapons which would destroy enemy airplanes and missiles attacking our homeland. The Army's NIKE AJAX and NIKE HERCULES missiles, are capable of finding and tracking down aircraft with the relentlessness of a bloodhound and with an intelligence almost human. These missiles are part of a family of antiaircraft and antimissile missiles which we hope will make our skies so inhospitable as to discourage attack by any potential aggressor. The Army, a pioneer in missile development, is making wide use of American science and industry in order to improve these powerful weapons and to develop an operational antimissile missile. Progress in missiles is progress in deterrence.

A fourth contribution which the Army makes to the deterrence posture of the U. S. military might is found in its reserves of civilian soldiers. Since this country can never afford to have, in being, all of the military units required for a total military effort, it must possess a backup of reserve units and individuals ready for emergency employment. In contrast to World Wars I and II, however, any next conflict of equal proportion would not allow us the luxury of arming deliberately behind the protection of our allies. Well-trained and ready reserves must be available as reinforcements to support our overseas deployments. An enemy's estimate of the quality of our reserve forces, their combat readiness and their rate of deployment abroad will necessarily influence his decisions and courses of action. Thus it is that the Army never ceases in its efforts to improve the quality of its National Guard and Army Reserve. Excellent progress is being made towards the achievement of our objective of having reserve units capable of mobilizing and preparing for overseas movement within a few months.

The deterrent effect of our own Army forces is extended by that of the indigenous armies which we assist in developing. The Army performs an important role in helping to teach the forces of 43 free countries how to use and maintain the equipment made available under the military aid programs and in assisting them to develop over 200 combat divisions. From an Army point of view the military aid program is of the utmost strategic value because it allows the development of forces capable of protecting areas threatened by aggression, and of gaining the indispensable time needed for the arrival of our help. The improved readiness of these allied units represents a significant contribution to the deterrence of war in areas where otherwise military weakness might encourage aggression.

These Army contributions to deterrence: our overseas deployments, our ready and mobile Strategic Army Forces, our air defense forces, our reserve components, and our assistance to allied forces represent approximately 67 percent of the Army's uniformed personnel and approximately 58 percent of its dollar budget. Behind these forces there must be a strong support base represented by activities in such diversified fields as logistics, research and development, command and administration. These support elements for our forces contributing directly to deterrence represent the remainder of the manpower and dollars of today's Army.

From the foregoing, it is easy to recognize the magnitude and importance of the Army's contribution to the national security through deterrence.



## SECTION V

### THE MISSION OF THE ARMY

All the military Services, through a harmonious combination of mutually supporting capabilities, must develop the strength necessary to deter war or to be victorious in war should deterrence fail.

Recognizing the primary importance of the deterrent feature of its mission, the Army contributes to the balanced deterrence of the national security team by:

- (1) Maintaining strong combat-ready forces overseas,
- (2) Maintaining behind these overseas forces Strategic Army Forces which are earmarked for prompt response to local aggression anywhere in the world or to reinforce our overseas deployment in case of general war,
- (3) Providing antiaircraft units for the air defense of the United States and our field forces.
- (4) Providing trained reserve forces in the United States capable of rapid mobilization,
- (5) Continuing to develop the ground forces of our allies about the world.

However, should deterrence fail, what then becomes the mission of the Army? Stated in its simplest form, it is "to defeat hostile land forces and to gain control of the land of its people." It is with that end in mind that we organize, train, equip and prepare to fight.

In analyzing this mission, emphasis should first be laid on the Army's taking as its goal the destruction of enemy military forces. We are constantly impressed, as we view the destructive effect of modern weapons, with the need for discrimination in the use of those weapons. All of the Services are deeply aware of the need for versatility so that we can apply military force appropriately according to the circumstance. For this reason the Army will always require so-called conventional weapons in quantity because there will be many situations for which an atomic weapon, even if available, is not the appropriate response. The Army must have weapons which will destroy the sniper in the church steeple without destroying the bishop and his entire diocese.

We are additionally impressed with the need for a discriminatory capability because of the likelihood that we may be called upon to

fight in friendly countries which are the victim of aggression. Hence, it will be important for us to be able to conduct military operations with a minimum cost to our friends and their property.

A second point with regard to the Army mission relates to the term "land forces". It should be underlined that the Army is concerned with hostile armies, wherever found. There has been a tendency in recent years to feel that the Army should interest itself with tactical rather than strategical objectives. In the jargon of the military, strategic is generally taken to refer to military operations away from the battlefield; tactical to refer to those activities which take place in the presence of the enemy. Obviously, all of the Services have both strategic and tactical interests. Certainly the Army is vitally concerned with the strategic land forces of an enemy which may later appear before us as our tactical enemy.

One final comment upon the mission relative to the phrase "to gain control of the land and its people." Inevitably, there is a uniquely conclusive character to this mission. Regardless of the nature and duration of the preliminary operations of a war, final victory will fall to the side which can occupy the ultimate source of the hostile war-making capability. There are those who think that because of the destructive ability of our new weapons, the occupation of the enemy's territory may be little more than a triumphal entry followed by military occupation. If control of the enemy's land and its people comes about this way, all well and good. But on the other hand, the final decision may not be reached until we have destroyed the enemy forces—even though remnants—in the tough, sweaty, bloody, dirty and hazardous business of sustained ground combat which the Army knows so well.

Not only must the Army perform its part in winning the war, it must assist in winning it in such a way as to bring about a better peace. No serious military man can think solely in terms of war without regard for the ensuing peace. The Army is particularly inclined to keep these considerations in mind. Since participating in the victory of World War II, the Army has spent years "picking up the pieces," so to speak, in the countries to whose defeat it had largely contributed. No one can observe at first hand the after-effects of great wars without developing a deep feeling of responsibility for the manner of waging war. There can be no cause for joy in the concept of the big war with the atomic onslaught. It becomes the duty of every military man to deter that kind of war if at all possible. It is with this ultimate end in mind that the Army prepares its plans and adjusts its means.

## **SECTION VI**

### **FUTURE LAND BATTLE AND ITS REQUIREMENTS**

Perhaps the most pressing problem which the Army has been facing is the assessment of the impact of atomic-bearing missiles and projectiles on the nature of the land battle and effecting the proper adjustment of organization, techniques, equipment and weapons. In view of the technological revolution which we have been witnessing, it is difficult to predict the shape of these future operations. However, by combining experience of the past with data on modern weapons potential, it is possible to estimate with some degree of logic what may face us.

Before continuing, one point should be made. There will never again be a war involving the major powers without the use or threat of use of atomic weapons. Until they are employed the threat will hang over every engagement and will impose a requirement for constant readiness for an atomic surprise and will force the opponents to deploy and fight the same as if atomics were being utilized.

It is visualized that the atomic battlefield of the future will have much greater breadth and depth than battlefields of the past in order to permit the requisite dispersion. There will probably be a checkerboard disposition of units with considerable gaps between combat elements. Combat action will be characterized by fluidity, with rapid concentration of widely dispersed forces, followed by equally rapid dispersion. Tactical units will have to be capable of operating over extended distances on a fluid battlefield, with a minimum of control by higher headquarters, and constantly prepared for all-around combat. Areas which are vital must be fought for and held as in the past; the resulting battle may be characterized by many violent clashes of relatively short duration. These areas will be held as means of controlling the battle, destroying enemy force, creating favorable opportunities for employment of tactical nuclear weapons, and denying similar advantages to the enemy.

The problem of the ground commander will be to find the enemy, to determine his configuration, and then to destroy him by directing atomic fire upon him, using organic weapons or calling down the fire of distant missiles deployed to the rear. Thereafter the commander will need instant mobility to exploit the effects of this destructive fire.

The dispersion on the nuclear battlefield will not be limited to only the fighting forces, but will necessarily be found in the administrative and logistical installations as well. This portends that installations such as large fixed ports will be a thing of the past.

The foregoing portrays briefly what we may expect the effect of nuclear weapons to be on the land battle of the future. What does this spell in the form of requirements?

In developing future Army forces adaptable to these conditions, we are impressed with the need to accomplish four things. First, we must increase our ability to locate atomic targets on the battlefield. Second, we must increase our ability to deliver atomic fires. Third, we must reduce our susceptibility to detection by the enemy. Fourth, we must increase our ability to exploit our own firepower.

Unless we develop and hold a relative advantage in the field of target acquisition, relative superiority in atomic weapons has little meaning. Past difficulties in locating targets for conventional weapons have been compounded in the case of the vastly more efficient atomic weapons. The expense of these new weapons, their great destructiveness and their potential hazard to our own forces are potent reasons against their promiscuous employment. Furthermore, the range of the atomic-bearing missile far exceeds the range of current artillery and adds to the acquisition-observation difficulty.

Thus, long-range target acquisition is technologically one of the most complex of the major scientific problems confronting the Army. We foresee the possibility of obtaining effective location devices which will vastly extend the Army's present observation capabilities. At the same time we are asking the Air Force to reinforce its efforts to help us find all targets which fall within range of our improved Army weapons. This is the field in which the Air Force can provide in the future the most useful form of close support.

It will probably always be difficult to discover targets among the forces of an alert and well-trained enemy. The efforts of technology will never suffice alone; they must be supplemented by tactics designed to cause the enemy to create remunerative targets. It may be not too much to say that the purpose of land maneuver tends to become that of finding or forming suitable enemy atomic targets, then of exploiting the effect of atomic fire. Thus, it is that the atomic weapons and the forces which they support are completely interdependent. Atomic weapons in themselves are inconclusive. In the final analysis, sizable ground forces must be used if the enemy, his people, and his land are to be brought under control. Atomic weapons to be effective must be used in conjunction with land operations. This fact is basic to the organization of modern armies and is in direct contradiction to the

mistaken concept that atomic weapons can somehow replace ground forces, whereas in actuality they only support them.

Not only must we improve our ability to discover targets, but also we must hold and increase our current advantage in relative abilities to deliver atomic fires. The continued development of a wide range of low-yield tactical atomic weapons and diversified delivery means is essential. The tactical missile family is already reducing the Army's requirement for close combat air support. This trend will continue. Its pace will be determined largely by the rate of progress in target acquisition techniques.

It is here that we should remind ourselves that the Army's organization is readily adaptable to the support of surface-launched missile operations of all kinds. It has already in its structure most of the elements which will be needed to reconnoiter and survey missile sites, transport missiles thereto, camouflage their positions, and defend them from hostile interference on the ground. All of these supporting operations are indispensable; the Army now has units already in its organic structure to discharge these functions.

While we must increase our ability to deliver atomic fires, there is a simultaneous need to evaluate the continuing requirement for so-called conventional weapons. There has been much talk about the impossibility, mostly from the point of view of expense, of maintaining one set of "old fashioned" forces to fight non-atomic wars. The Army does not interpret the problem in these terms. It is possible, indeed essential, to inject into a single set of forces an either-or capability, an ability to use atomic weapons as the situation requires and as proper authority determines, if the Army is to be able to discharge its role in future warfare. This duality—the built-in capability to use atomic and non-atomic weapons in any combination—is not a straddling of the issue but, rather, a basic necessity for Army forces. Army forces must not be completely dependent on atomic weapons. There are conceivable situations when it may be to our own interest to establish restrictions on the use of these destructive weapons. Hence, the indispensable either-or capability.

Paralleling the increase in its atomic capacity and its building in the dual capability into its weapons, the Army must aggressively seek ways and means of reducing its susceptibility to detection by an enemy who may possess the atomic means to destroy any important element of our force which he is able to find.

Modern armies, with their elaborate equipment, are difficult to conceal, as are their logistic supporting echelons in the rear. In this respect they are at a significant disadvantage with relatively primitive forces such as those we fought in Korea. Such forces have inherent

characteristics which significantly reduce their susceptibility to detection. They have a protective coloration which results from their lesser dependence upon elaborate and massive supporting elements, the austerity of their logistical support and their innate cunning and patience. These characteristics permit maximum utilization of the advantages offered by jungles and mountains in areas where peripheral wars would most likely break out, and thus enhance in such places the difficulties of target acquisition.

Lacking these natural assets and unwilling to decrease susceptibility to detection by going primitive as it were, we are faced with a great challenge to our ingenuity to control our own tendency to present lucrative atomic targets. Rejecting retrogression as a means to safety, we must seek solution in the principle that "safety lies forward," technologically as well as tactically. The improvement of cross-country mobility holds forth the best prospects of reducing the susceptibility to enemy detection of Army combat forces. This mobility may eventually be attained largely by low-flying air vehicles. The susceptibility to detection of our logistic bases is a primary problem which deserves our unremitting effort to reduce by any and all means. Austerity is essential but austerity alone is not enough. Aerial transport, nuclear engines, solid fuel—these are the directions in which they must go. The ability to disperse and hide, coupled with ability to converge and fight, requires mobility of a kind we have only begun to appreciate. Too often in the past the mobility we sought as protection against atomic fires simply increased the number of vehicles and amount of equipment in the battle zone and, by so doing, created for the enemy the potential targets we seek to avoid.

A final consideration related to the compelling necessity to reduce our vulnerability to atomic fire is the need to exploit rapidly the effects of our own fire. Increased tactical mobility and increased mechanization of the logistics system are two devices already mentioned which contribute to this end. Rapidity of offensive reaction must stem not only from an increased mobility and streamlined command echelon, but also from the ability of small battle groups to operate independently for long periods over great distances, coupled with an ability to live dispersed and to concentrate rapidly to fight.

It would be improper to speak of the ingredients for success in ground warfare only in such military terms as fire and movement. The Army, as well as the other Services, will be no better than the people who make it up. We need personnel, number-wise and quality-wise, but quality should be stressed more than number. There is a tendency in this country to measure military strength by a head count. To accurately interpret strength, you must look inside the

number and see what kind of people fill the uniforms forming the ranks of the Army. The difference between the quality of our people and that of an aggressor may be the difference between victory and defeat.

With respect to the quantity of personnel, we have already alluded to the misconception that atomic weapons can replace ground forces. There is also the erroneous impression held in the minds of some that, although ground forces are necessary, when they are armed with an atomic capability the numbers of soldiers can be reduced. It would appear that the very reverse may be true. Contributing to this trend are such factors as the dispersed logistical system requiring more units and more people to operate the small, scattered supply installations.

Thus we have seen that the conception of future land battle requires the Army to increase its capability for target acquisition and for organic atomic firepower. It must be harder to find and more difficult to destroy. It must be highly mobile to exploit its own destructive firepower. It must be manned by high quality personnel. With these requirements as its goal the Army is making real progress in fulfilling them.

The major reorganization of the Army's main combat forces has been undertaken in order to improve our ability to fight effectively under conditions of atomic warfare without loss of capability to conduct so-called conventional warfare. The organic equipment of the new divisions consists of that habitually needed in any likely theater of operations. Equipment needed only intermittently or only in a specific geographical area is not assigned to the division but is pooled in reserve behind the division. Adherence to this principle has resulted in considerable economy and increased effectiveness in the use of equipment.

Modern signal equipment permits a commander to control a larger number of subordinate units than the three which were standard under the old triangular concept. In the new infantry and airborne divisions, we have taken five subordinate units as a reasonable step forward in extending the span of control. This action permits the elimination of one echelon of headquarters with a consequent economy in personnel overhead.

Finally in shaping these new divisions we have included a capacity for absorbing progressively the new weapons which we expect to emerge in the next few years. We are building into our weapons the necessary either-or capability.

We have determined that our new infantry and airborne divisions have the following advantages over their older counterparts:

- a.* Increased front line fighting strength.
- b.* Increased mobility through aviation and cross-country vehicles.
- c.* Atomic capability in the artillery.
- d.* Greatly improved firepower.

In addition to the organizational change to adapt the Army to the future, steps are also being taken to assure us that the quality of our manpower will be of the standard required on the future battlefield. Those individuals lacking the capacity to become useful members of the Army are being eliminated. Our training programs are continually under review to assure that our soldiers receive the type and caliber of instruction best suited for what we expect the future to hold. New techniques are being tested as developed.

Army research and development efforts are continuing to provide us with the modern tools which the future land battle will require. Simultaneously our logisticians are developing and testing the systems which will reduce the vulnerability of their installations.

In whatever field of Army endeavor you may wish to look you can see great strides being made to provide an Army with the organization, techniques, equipment and weapons which will be responsive to the requirements of the land battles of the future.



## SECTION VII

### MEASURED RETALIATION AND THE VERSATILE ARMY

Although it is difficult to predict in matters of this nature, logic would seem to dictate that as parity is approximated in numbers and types of nuclear weapons between the East and West, every effort will be made on both sides to avoid the general nuclear war. This, in turn, will raise the level of provocation which must be reached before a resort to arms will result. Since it is not reasonable to assume that the Communist bloc will give up aggression as an instrument of policy, it appears probable that by pressure on the soft spots about the Soviet periphery they will continue to seek an extension of their boundaries at the expense of the West. Failing to respond quickly and effectively to this type of aggression will permit the piecemeal loss of important areas belonging to friends and allies and might create situations which would expand into the general war which all wish to avoid.

As one considers the list of potential trouble spots against which such Communist pressure might be exerted, e. g., the Middle East, South Vietnam, Taiwan and Korea, one is bound to reflect on the varied requirements for effective military action in these areas. Facts of geography, climate, ethnology and politics would make every case a special one. They have at least one characteristic in common—any military action therein will probably be essentially a land operation.

Since World War II, the Free World has been involved in military actions against Communism in several areas to include Greece, Korea and Southeast Asia. None of these conflicts has resulted in general war, and in none have the so-called unconventional weapons been employed. This fact adds strength to the argument that the course of future war, like most human events, remains largely unpredictable and consequently our military forces must be ready for many variants. We must have forces which are flexible and which can apply military power with intelligent selectivity.

The Army is the most flexible form of military power. By possessing both conventional and nuclear weapons, the Army can adjust the power of its blows to the situation at hand. There is great military significance in the fact that the Army has weapons which vary

from the MP's pistol to the kiloton yields of heavy nuclear weapons. This gradation in the effect of our weapons gives a great flexibility in the application of the military power. The Army has a unique ability to proportion punishment to fit the crime of aggression; that is to say, it has the capability for "measured retaliation." It can vary its striking force to counter aggression ranging from unsupported patrols to the onslaught of many field armies supported by nuclear weapons.

Further, the Army is ready to fight the war wherever it occurs and is prepared to fight it on the element where it will end. As long as men lead their lives on land, as long as they draw their strength from the earth—in short, as long as they are men—all wars will end on the land. It is here that the Army, which is the military force designed to gain land objectives, answers our national needs.

Whatever the destructive effect of firepower—and firepower may be in the form of bullets, shells, rockets, or bombs—there will always be the need for men on the ground to exploit the success of that firepower and to clinch the victory by occupying that portion of the earth's surface from which the enemy derives his strength to wage war.

Regardless of the duration of a war, Army forces will be needed throughout. Long or short, a war can end in only one of three ways. The enemy may surrender in place, in which case the Army must be there to accept that surrender and impose our terms. Alternatively, he may try to run away, in which case only the Army can catch him, fix him, and destroy him. Finally, he may fight on to a finish as did Hitler. Here again, that finish can only be achieved on the ground, and our Army forces abroad today are the nucleus of the force which will do the job.

## SECTION VIII

### MANPOWER

#### Caliber of Leaders

The Army will never be any better than the people who compose it. The modern Army with its complicated weapons and difficult leadership requirements needs to improve the quality of its personnel and the way they are used. The Army is making encouraging progress in increasing the professional proportion of its strength. However, there is a constant need to proselyte openly and boldly the most promising young men of our country, urging them to take the Army as a career. They will do so only if the Army is obviously a first-class organization to which it is an honor to belong.

It is recognized that the increasing load of human knowledge and experience imposes added burdens upon leaders not only in the Army but also in all walks of modern life. But it is doubtful that in any profession technology is exercising greater pressure than in the military. The advent of nuclear weapons and delivery systems of great range and flexibility, coupled with increased mobility based on air transport, have combined to create military problems of impressive proportions. The magnitude of the responsibilities of military leaders has impressed such men as Dr. James B. Conant, who has stated: "As I look over the fence at the task which confronts our military men, I am appalled by the job in purely technical terms. To plan the production and use of weapons not yet developed and to anticipate with any certainty the technical progress of a potential enemy in a rapidly moving area, seems almost humanly impossible. I should like to record my deepest sympathy for those who will be charged with the responsibilities for the defense of the country in the period which lies ahead."

Another great scientist, Dr. Vannevar Bush, has indicated his concept of the requirements of our military planners. He views them as needing "a reasonable grasp of atomistics, appreciation of the trends of modern biology, a knowledge of many aspects of electronics, possibilities and limitations of jet propulsion, and a dozen other fields of applied physics and chemistry." The task looks indeed formidable as described by these qualified leaders of the scientific world.

Certainly none of our military leaders can afford to be without some scientific background. They cannot be experts in any specific field, but they must have at least a general knowledge of the language of many scientific fields. With some comprehension of the language of science, they will then have a greater chance of evaluating correctly the possibilities of the research and development programs which form such an important part of the work of the military Services in preparing themselves for future warfare. They will be better qualified to make the very difficult decisions which guide the effort in developing new equipment, tactics and techniques for the future.

Our military leaders cannot have scientific knowledge alone. They must be students of warfare with an imagination capable of projecting forward the principles of the past to the specific requirements of the future. They must be able to visualize the effects of new weapons and to pattern tactics and organizations appropriate to the battlefields of the future. All of this requires work—and sweat. No demand on the individual can be too great in an area where there is little allowable margin for delay, indecisiveness or error.

But the soldier cannot be merely a student of scientific and military theory. He must have a good mixture of business judgment as well. The American Army today is one of the largest businesses in the world, with property worth many billions. The Army runs manufacturing plants, depots, ports, transportation systems; it is involved in one way or another in virtually every form of industrial activity known to our civil society. The military leader must know something about all of these in order to possess the ability to verify that he is getting the most defense from the men, money and materials made available to him.

Nor is it enough for the leader to have some knowledge of science and business as well as being a soldier; he must also be an administrator and diplomat as well. To operate our military aid program in 43 countries of the world, we must have senior officers who speak foreign languages, know foreign history, understand foreign psychology and are able to represent the United States with ability under trying and complicated situations. The Army has been called upon in the past and may be called upon again to occupy defeated countries, to restore their economy, and to repair the damage of war. Soldiers with no special preparation for the task have often unexpectedly found themselves governors, pro-consuls and high commissioners where a knowledge of government, of economics and of politics is an indispensable part of the day's work.

## **The Army's Obligation to Its Members**

We in the Army view with great seriousness our obligation toward the young soldiers and consider ourselves in duty bound to return them to the communities better citizens for having served in the Army. Throughout the time a man wears the Army uniform, we bear in mind his ultimate destiny of being a civilian citizen. We hope and expect that those of our soldiers who leave the Army to return to civilian life will be better equipped, by virtue of having been soldiers, to gain a livelihood, to become heads of families and to discharge their civic responsibilities. Many of our activities in the Army are justified solely as an expression of our sense of responsibility for the alumni of the Army.

In the course of a young man's service in the Army, we leave no stone unturned to send him back to civil life physically, mentally and morally a better man. On the physical side, the Army gives thorough recognition to the importance of providing a scientifically organized food service that guarantees balance and maximum nutritional benefit. Great stress is laid upon the physical development of the individual throughout the training program.

On the mental side, the scope of Army military teaching embraces every phase of Army organization and many levels of instruction. Many thousands of new soldiers each year are taught the basic combat techniques and advanced individual or specialist training. Not only do we train recruits but we run the schools ranging from courses for the lowest grade specialist to the requirements for the intellectual and professional development of our senior officers. The Army's educational system embraces a total of 35 schools and extends from West Point to the Army War College with a wide variety of technical and specialist schools in between. A total of 500 courses are taught by these schools from which over 140,000 students graduated during 1956. In addition, thousands of active duty and reserve component soldiers yearly continue at home or in off-duty time their military studies by participating in the Army Extension Course Program.

Not only does the Army instruct in military and technical subjects, but it has great concern for the underprivileged man who has never been allowed to complete his basic education. Each year we receive many young men who have never completed fourth grade primary education. We put these men into classes and, on duty time, raise their standard so that, as a minimum, they can read and write and thus become better soldiers, and eventually better citizens. Emphasis has been placed on raising the educational standards of our noncommissioned officers, some of whom have displayed great leadership

potential, yet have not reached high school. This group the Army singles out for schooling, so that the man who wears the chevrons of a noncommissioned officer will also have minimum educational qualifications. The peacetime Army is a great school, open to all men according to their talents.

In addition to the schools conducted by the Army, we call heavily upon the resources of the civilian school system using, wherever possible, civilian institutions to train our technicians and specialists. Throughout American universities today, there are many officers in training, receiving instruction in fields ranging from bacteriology and business administration to guided missiles and electronics. Since 1946, when our Graduate Civil Schooling Program was established, over 2,600 officers, excluding those in the medical service, have received post graduate degrees from American universities. In a recent school semester over 500 officers were enrolled in studies in over 40 fields in 48 American and 4 European universities.

Now, a word about the moral influences which the Army creates and fosters. The Army is a decent, clean-living, God-fearing society. The primary protection for the young men who enter the Army is found in the character of the leaders who command our units. We carefully select these noncommissioned officers and junior officers, eliminating all those who fail to maintain the required standards of leadership. The Officer Corps is one dedicated to the welfare of its men, a Corps which recognizes that the symbols of rank—the bars, the leaves, and the stars—are not indications of privilege, but rather emblems of responsibility, responsibility for the men whom they lead in peace and in war.

There is another way in which the Army contributes importantly to the development of the character of our soldiers. We have what we call the "Troop Information Program" in which we try to present the important world issues to our men. One of the most important tasks of our national leadership is to develop the habit of serious thought on the part of our young people. They cannot be moral fence-sitters in a period when the issues are so important. They must have strong convictions as to what is right and wrong. In order to develop such convictions, our young people must know the issues and the alternatives. Thus, the Army tries to stress to its young soldiers the need for studying world issues. We try to explain to our soldiers the "why" of things, hoping that in this way they will interest themselves in all of the issues and problems which confront our Nation. We believe that if they leave the military service understanding both the place of America in modern history and their place as citizens of this great country, they will carry back to civil life attributes of great worth in developing the future strength of our nation.

## **Need for Stability**

An efficient military program must be able to count upon a relatively constant number of people available to support it. That is to say, assuming no worsening of the international situation, the soldiers and civilians making up the Army should remain about the same in number throughout a fiscal year. The input of recruits each month should be roughly 1/12 of the total input for the year; and the discharge rate should be roughly equivalent to that input rate. For reasons generally beyond the control of the Army, such balance of output and input has never been achieved. Yet the ideal condition would contribute more to the efficiency and economy of the operation of the Army than any other condition. The size of this yearly turnover of personnel is tremendous. For example, the Army entered fiscal year 1956 with 1,109,000 men. In that year we lost 460,000 soldiers and gained 377,000, ending with a total strength of 1,026,000 men. You can imagine the effect upon business enterprises if they were forced to turn over more than 40 percent of their personnel in 1 year, and do the same thing every year thereafter.

Soldiers who leave the Army carry with them important skills of high-dollar value acquired in their military training. Industry and business recognize the value of these men and do much to attract them away from a service career. The Army is proud of the fact that it returns men to civil life improved by military service, but this constant loss of trained men is costly and detrimental to the over-all efficiency of the Army. A way must be found to reduce the turnover which faces all Services today.

## SECTION IX

### THE RESERVE COMPONENTS

Our Armed Forces have as their primary objective the deterrence of war. However, they must make provision for the possibility that the deterrence may fail and that general or limited war may occur. In the event of general war, many of our reserve forces will find themselves in active operations from the outset. We have never had, and probably never will have, active Army forces sufficient to meet all of our military requirements in the early months of a war. Consequently, the Army looks to its reserve forces, its National Guard and Army Reserve, to fill the gaps which will exist in our active Army structure.

It is entirely possible that general war, if it comes, will begin with a surprise atomic attack on the continental United States. In such a case, our reserve antiaircraft forces will be needed at once to man their weapons and to defend the skies of the United States. Concurrently, those elements of the reserve forces which form the so-called mobilization base must proceed directly to their stations prepared to execute those mobilization tasks possible at the time. Trained reservists must be started overseas as soon as practicable to replace the losses which will occur in the troops of our overseas garrisons. All of these categories are D-Day requirements which must come from our reserve forces.

Immediately behind these D-Day forces, in order of urgency of employment, come those units which will be needed overseas to fulfill commitments to our allies and to support U. S. forces in combat. The first to go will be our active Army divisions in the U. S. Behind these should follow the reserve divisions and support-type reserve units needed to balance out the overseas Army. They are required overseas just as rapidly as transportation can be provided. They should be ready for movement from the U. S. in a matter of weeks.

While these events are going on, it is quite likely that the requirements of civil defense may become a major field of endeavor for many military units. In case of national emergency resulting from atomic attack, every man in uniform, every military unit of the active Army or of the reserves in the U. S., may be called upon to play a critical



part in retrieving disaster. Only units with thorough military training and carefully inculcated discipline can be expected to cope with the conditions to be anticipated. There will be a need for individual training, for unit cohesion and for firm leadership similar to that required on the battlefield. Thus, the conditions of modern warfare place the highest premium on completely trained civilian components not only for combat duty but also to help preserve their communities from chaos resulting from the use of modern weapons.

These conditions at home may have a critical influence upon the ability of our country to mobilize. Consideration of the consequences of atomic attack raises the doubt that our reserve components will have much time after D-Day to train themselves for their wartime role. The day of the deliberate mobilization and unhurried training is past. The accent is on readiness on D-Day or as shortly thereafter as possible. Thus it is that those who are responsible for the defense of their country must insist on a much higher degree of readiness on the part of our reserve forces than ever in the past.

The condition of general atomic war just considered probably will not be initiated by either side in the period of mutual atomic parity. But, even in the case of military operations short of general war, the readiness of the reserve components must be increased beyond levels which were known in the past. If our country should decide to resist aggression in some distant part of the world, we would probably wish to dispatch promptly a number of our active Army divisions to deal with the situation on the ground. Such an action would undoubtedly create additional world tensions and enhance the possibility of general war. Under such conditions, it would be most important to replace quickly in our Strategic Army Force in the U. S. those active Army units dispatched to meet aggression. They should be replaced in a period of weeks as a matter of urgency in order that overall military posture may not be weakened. At the same time, in view of the heightened danger of general war, there would be a requirement to add reserve units to our antiaircraft defenses. Thus, the two D-Day categories of reserve forces—those of the mobilization base needed to generate new units and those of the antiaircraft defense—would be required, at least in part, as in the case of general war. Division-size units of the reserves and reserve combat loss replacements would again be needed in a matter of weeks.

In summary, either in the case of general atomic war or military operations short thereof there is an urgent requirement for reserve forces of increased readiness. It is encouraging to report that the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 is making it possible to fill reserve units with well-trained men.

In fact the recruiting for the six months training program has been so dramatically successful that it was found necessary to place restrictions upon it. This limitation on recruiting resulted from a consideration of available funds, equipment and training facilities. We cannot take in more reservists than our money will allow and our facilities support. There are limitations on the number of active Army personnel which can be diverted to reserve training without reducing to an unacceptable degree the combat readiness of Army units. In terms of facilities, it is very uneconomical to open up training installations on a short-term basis and then close them down just to take care of a hump in manpower input. What had to be done was to level out our input of reservists to stay within the dollars, facilities and trainer manpower available and programmed.

At this point the emphasis went from recruiting to training—from numbers to quality. With an assured input of trained individuals into the reserves, the next job in increasing their readiness was to conduct effective reserve unit training. Individual reservists from our six months training period as well as veterans returning from the active service with a Ready Reserve obligation give us the individual potential to build highly effective Ready Reserve units. But they must receive effective training in their reserve units. Fresh from active duty, these new men will know their business, and they will insist upon realistic and effective training. If we do not maintain a high standard of training in our reserve units, the enthusiasm brought to the unit by the trained individuals will be lost, and the success of the entire program will be in jeopardy.

This obligation to produce effective training is shared by the active Army and by the reserves—particularly by the reserve unit commanders. The Army is aware of the problem of the reserve officer commanders of these units and the difficulty of reconciling the obligations of their civilian professions with the requirements of their military units. The Active Army is anxious to render them all possible assistance to ease their burdens and at the same time assure that their units progress in quality of training and of over-all combat readiness.

A few words about budgetary matters as they affect the programs of the reserve components are in order. For the next few years, the Army is faced with living under a budget fixed at about 1957 dollar levels. This would not seem too hard at first glance but does, in fact, pose many serious problems. General prices are going up, particularly in those areas where we buy our items of high dollar value. The new weapons and equipment which we must buy to modernize the Army—missiles, electronic equipment, helicopters and the like—are coming much higher than was originally estimated. The soldiers to

use and maintain this increasingly complicated equipment require much longer periods of training and, once trained, should be better paid if they are to be retained in the Service. Thus, our future pay costs tend to rise. These factors, among others, make it very hard for the Army to live within a budget fixed at 1957 levels. The pressure will be to reduce our forces at a time when it is difficult to forecast a reduction in our worldwide, military commitments.

In this climate of budgetary compression, the Army must endeavor to keep a proper balance among the elements of the Army budget to assure a maximum of fighting strength from the aggregate. There must be a balance between numbers of individuals and numbers of units, between personnel and equipment, between atomic and non-atomic weapons, between forces in being and forces in reserve. No one area can be excessively favored at the cost of another—the aggregate must produce a harmonious balance of mutually reinforcing components.

In the light of these considerations, plainly there is some limit to the size of the Ready Reserve beyond which we cannot go without destroying the balance of our forces. It is believed that a level of about 400,000 for the National Guard and 300,000 for the Army Reserve is, for the foreseeable future, just about all that we can afford. In compensation, the emphasis should be placed on individual and unit quality rather than upon numbers.

Under this numerical ceiling and with the increase in quality which is anticipated, it should be possible for the reserves to fulfill the role which has been outlined. In the present situation of "cold war", they will be a visible indication of the follow-up strength of the U. S. Army. In case of war, they will round out the Strategic Army Force and provide units and individuals to replace the active forces moved overseas. If our homeland is attacked, they can man many of the anti-aircraft defenses and participate in civil defense in accordance with the requirements of the emergency.

These tasks for the reserves are important and indispensable parts of the over-all mission of the Army. Never has the need for ready reserves been clearer than at present. Never has the level of required readiness been so high.

## SECTION X

### ARMY SUPPORT OF OUR ALLIES

In rendering its report in March 1957, the Citizens Advisory Commission on the Mutual Security Program, chaired by Mr. Benjamin Fairless, pointed out as a basic premise that the U. S. with only 6 percent of the world's population needs the aid of other countries just as they need our assistance. The Commission emphasized that today, in a world shrinking in time and space, our experience in three wars in less than a half-century and the persistent threat of International Communism in many parts of the world demonstrate the need for collective action with other nations of the Free World. Therefore, the Commission concluded that a collective security program will be essential for years to come and it is in our own national interest to be a part of this undertaking as long as critical world tensions and threats to our security persist.

This is a concise statement of U. S. national policy. It has been our expressed and specific national policy since 1949 when we joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Since then we have joined additional mutual defense arrangements until today we are allied militarily with 42 other nations. We are presently supplying military assistance to 38 nations. Since 1949 we have spent over 50 billion dollars on our Mutual Security Program—the bulk of it military in nature. Our Mutual Security Program is designed to assist in maintaining a common, worldwide defense against the constant threat of International Communism. The Program stresses mutual security—the security of both the United States as well as our Free World Allies. It is frequently misnamed by its opponents as the Foreign Aid Program or a “giveaway” Program. Those opposed to the Program conveniently overlook the fact that 80 percent of the cost of the Program is spent in the United States on the products of American industry and agriculture. The public must understand that the Mutual Security Program is one of collective security—not just an aid program.

The question may be asked, “Why, in the day of intercontinental ballistic missiles and earth girdling satellites, should we link our fortunes with other countries, some of which are relatively weak and highly vulnerable to Communist aggression?” First of all, let us

recognize that the strengths of the U. S. and the Soviet Union are so nearly in balance that what happens in the rest of the world may be decisive in terms of the long range struggle. There are three specific reasons why we cannot permit Communism to absorb additional areas of the Free World:

*First*, we cannot survive militarily or even economically without certain critical materials which are found only outside this country. We would be in grave difficulties without imports of chromite, manganese, bauxite, cobalt, and tungsten, to name only a few.

*Second*, we would be making a serious error to withdraw within our own borders where our population, our industry, and our Armed Forces would be concentrated in a more compressed target area.

*Third*, we cannot surrender our role in Free World leadership without surrendering at the same time the power from which that leadership stems.

Now, then, does the Mutual Security Program protect our overseas interests in this nuclear and missile age? The answer to this question raises a subject so elementary and so simple that it has been left in a cloud of radioactive dust by fancier concepts which hold the center of the stage today more by virtue of their novelty than their soundness.

The central thought in this simple but apparently old-fashioned concept is that military plans should be drawn up in order to accomplish specific, clearly-defined, profitable objectives. A corollary of this concept is that military forces and weapons should be designed to contribute toward the successful execution of these specific plans. This is to say that military means must be commensurate with the objectives which one seeks to attain. The tendency is great to tailor our military plans merely to fit the weapons which happen to be in our arsenal. The absurd lengths to which this fundamentally hind-part-before philosophy can be carried is nowhere more apparent than in the so-called Fortress America theory. This theory has it that we can afford only to maintain strategic retaliatory forces here in the United States, that allies are troublesome, that overseas bases are un dependable. This strategy rationalizes the necessity for collapsing all other military capabilities except in so far as they enable us to fight from Fortress America.

Our objective, among other things, is to prevent our friends and allies from being overrun, occupied and drawn behind the Iron Curtain by our enemies. Nations can only be overrun and occupied by troops on the ground. Let us not forget that every single Communist-backed attempt has been accompanied by ruthless aggression on the ground, either by subversion, coup d'etat, or armed intervention with ground forces. An impressive string of examples comes to

mind—Czechoslovakia, Greece, China, the Philippines, Malaya, Korea and Viet Nam. Nations can only be protected from such action by their own Army forces reinforced, as necessary, by their allies. If, for example, our objective is to stop an infiltration of Communist guerrillas in the jungles of Southeast Asia, then we must attain that objective by assisting our friends to develop the forces which have the capability to enter those jungles, search out the guerrillas, defeat them in their own environment, and restore peace and security in that part of the world.

This is the powerful rationale of the Mutual Security Program. We are assisting our allies to help themselves in the creation and maintenance of the kind of forces they are most apt to need to meet any local threat which confronts them. That these threats exist cannot be denied.

There is a school of thought today which contends that any "vital" issue would lead to a general war and then suggests that any issue less than vital is hardly worth our attention. This theory hardly explains a long succession of vital issues which did not lead to general war in the past and most of which were settled or favorably influenced our military assistance programs, such as the Communist aggressions or insurrections in Greece, Korea, the Philippines, and Indochina. Additionally, we could hardly characterize current Communist activities in Asia, the Middle East and certain countries in South America as unimportant or less than vital.

It seems perfectly clear that these local threats must be countered locally. In doing so we are confronted with the choice between deploying our own forces in every nook and cranny of the globe or helping our friends do the job themselves. All those who have actively and personally participated in the defense of our country can appreciate fully how important it is to keep these forces of our allies—especially along the frontiers of the Free World—equipped and ready to defend themselves and oppose any future Communist aggression. In defending themselves they also defend the United States. These are the objectives of our Mutual Security Program. The money spent for these purposes contributes substantially to the security of the United States, as well as to the security of our allies, and makes military, economic, and national security sense. It has always been an important concept of the Program to assist each country to furnish the forces and equipment which they are best able to furnish and for us to assist in filling the gap as necessary. The U. S. Army has always played a leading and vital role in the Mutual Security Program from the outset for one simple and outstanding reason. The threat which most of our allies face is a threat which can be countered mainly by Army forces.

A large part of the threat which confronts nations on the Communist border is political and psychological. Subversion, guerrilla warfare, coups d'état, border violations and extensive propaganda can only be met by a people united in their determination to stand firm. It is here that armies have a unique and direct application. An army is the people. Armies spring from the people and keep their roots deep in the heart of the land. An army draws its power and its loyalties from the people. There can be no strong army amid a weak and divided people; however, a strong army is a powerful force for unity and resolve in any country.

Mutual security is not a smooth and easy road. We are associated with free partners who have a community of interest with us but who also hold other independent values and national aims. There is a constant requirement for give-and-take and the adjustment of differences. We must learn to accept and live with this as a fact of life just as permanent and just as necessary as the turbulence which sometimes enters our homes and our domestic politics in which sweet harmony is not always the dominant note. We are strong—stronger now than any other nation in the Free World. We are respected—but we are also criticized just as we are apt to express impatience with some of our allies. This is not evidence that the alliances are crumbling—it is evidence that the alliances are *alive*.

There are indirect benefits from our mutual security programs which are seldom recognized. United States forces stationed abroad, and U. S. supported forces in other areas, help bring security and stability as a prerequisite to economic growth and prosperity. In many countries the local army represents a progressive—oftentimes the controlling—element. These armies have honorable traditions and their influence permeates the entire country.

Perhaps one of the greatest returns from the Mutual Security Program is the opportunity it affords for foreign officers to study and live in the United States. Since the beginning of the Program in 1949, we have trained in Army schools over 16,000 officers from countries associated with us in collective security efforts. There is no other program undertaken by this government which will have more long-range benefits than this program which brings into the United States groups of young men, many of whom will rise to leadership in their own countries in the course of time. Here we expose them not only to our military training but also give them a taste and feel of American life which could never be imparted through programs of foreign information. When these officers return to their homelands they are a powerful antidote to Communist propaganda about this country, its aims and its way of life.

Sometimes our armies furnish the bulk of the technical training conducted in the country. Often the only advanced training in organization and administration anywhere in these countries comes through the military programs sponsored and administered by the U. S. Army. Also, who can calculate the impact over a number of years of the fact that the English language is taught all over the Free World as the language of technology. It would not be an overstatement to say that the military training which we provide is an important element of the technical aid which many countries so badly need and which, by other means, we have furnished through the Technical Assistance Program.

The tremendous accomplishments of the United States Army in support of our allies are evident in many parts of the Free World. One of the best examples has been our experience in Korea. The Republic of Korea Army is the fourth largest Army in the world—second only to the U. S. in the Free World. The Republic of Korea Army was established in 1948 and since then has been under the continuous guidance of the U. S. Army Military Advisory Group. This Army came of age during the Korean War and acquitted itself with honor and distinction fighting shoulder-to-shoulder with United States and other forces of the United Nations Command. Since then it has been maintained in a highly trained state as a combat-ready force. Our military influence in the Republic of Korea has spread throughout the entire ROK Army. The Korean divisions are trained, organized and equipped with American equipment. Operational techniques are those developed in American military schools and training systems. The Korean Military Academy is patterned after West Point.

While there are many outstanding examples in other parts of the world, there is another example in the Far East equally illustrative of the value of the Mutual Security Program and the vital role played by the United States Army in the support of our allies—Viet Nam. In July 1954 the Geneva Armistice Agreements were signed by the French and the Communist Viet Minh. The country was divided along the 17th parallel. The government headed by Premier Ngo Diem faced an uncertain future. The 12 million southern Viet Nameese were war weary and divided by regional loyalties and religious groupings. The Army was weak, without leaders or experience beyond battalion level, and its loyalties were diffused and confused. The National Police was controlled by men hostile to the government of Premier Diem. There was no effective administrative or governmental machinery.

It was not suggested that the credit for the magnificent recovery of South Viet Nam belongs to other than the courageous people of that



beleaguered country and their present leadership, but the story would be far from complete if we failed to recognize that an important element in that recovery was the assistance rendered by a succession of able and dedicated United States Army officers who have headed and were members of our missions and representations in Saigon.

These officers, and the members of their respective missions, throughout the world, are men of integrity, ability, and stature. The influence is felt in broader fields than their purely military responsibilities. The government of our allies in Asia have learned to trust and rely upon the American Army officers, enlisted men and members in charge of our advisory groups and missions. Their advice is sought in many fields. We in the Army can well be proud of the work which these members of our Army are doing.

One of the earliest examples of the effectiveness of an Army mission of this character was the success of General Van Fleet in Greece. The Communist ELAS in 1947 were on the verge of taking control of this nation which now is a keystone in the NATO defense of Southeast Europe. By sheer determination and military competence the Van Fleet mission assisted the Greek Army in organizing itself into effective forces and in ridding the countryside of Communist forces. The American military influence in Greece is still great.

In Korea, in Viet Nam, and in Greece the problems were political, economic, psychological and military. The problems were local—the solutions were local. The plans which worked were local plans geared to local objectives and in their execution local Army forces dominated.

While attention has been given to but a few examples of the Army's important role in supporting our allies, the same pattern prevails in many other countries throughout the Free World today.

There is another aspect to the matter of allies which must not be forgotten. Whereas we are able to assist our allies in the development of forces adequate for purposes of internal stability and for initial resistance against overt aggression, none of them by themselves are strong enough to withstand alone a full-scale attack by Communist forces. Most of the countries involved are linked with us by mutual defense agreements. Therefore, each country expects us to fulfill our commitments and come to their aid if they are attacked. Here again is a mission in which the United States Army plays a leading role. We must maintain modern hard-hitting, strategically mobile Army forces which can come quickly to the aid of an ally and apply whatever force is required to assist him in maintaining his security against aggression without necessarily involving the rest of the world.

The question is frequently asked as to why we need Army forces for this purpose in these days when nuclear weapons can be delivered

by aircraft and by missiles. The answer is that enemy forces moving unopposed on the ground, particularly under cover of darkness, can remain dispersed and they can mingle almost indistinguishably with the civilian and refugee population so that they would be hard to find and difficult to defeat and destroy except by Army forces. It is only when invading forces pile up and against the barrier of Army tactical formations on the ground that military targets begin to form. Other forces operating in the absence of those Army forces would be like a hammer without the anvil of ground combat forces against which the enemy can be beaten and destroyed.

Today we are engaged in a bitter struggle for our very existence against a dangerous continuing threat—the most dangerous perhaps that this country has ever faced. So long as International Communism pursues its announced aims of destroying the Free World, we have no alternative but to defend ourselves. Our government and many nations of the Free World have properly decided that our best defense under these conditions lies in collective security which spreads the burden of security among many nations in accordance with the ability of each to provide what it can best contribute.

Our traditional American desire to get things done quickly poses serious problems for us in the present situation. We are all too much inclined to take our problems one at a time—attack them vigorously—wrap them up—put them aside and turn to the next one on the list. The problem of national and mutual security cannot be wrapped up and shelved in this manner so long as the threat of International Communism confronts us. No man alive can tell how long the threat will last. We must have the courage, determination, patience and perseverance to see this struggle through regardless of the length of time, the cost and effort required. Our responsibility then is to insure that the American people, and our allies as well, recognize the situation for what it is and the necessity for the nations of the Free World, individually and collectively, to maintain a high state of preparedness for the long, hard pull ahead.

## SECTION XI

### ARMY MISSILES

Army forces have a primary requirement and responsibility for surface-launched missiles employed in support of combat incident to operations on land and in the execution of the air defense mission assigned to the Army. Such missiles are not merely specialized items of equipment; all surface-launched missiles which meet Army operational requirements will be developed and integrated into Army forces, as a natural transition from present types of convention artillery.

In support of its requirements to fulfill its assigned roles and missions, the Army has developed and placed in general operational use ballistic and non-ballistic surface-to-surface missiles, free rockets and surface-to-air missiles. The Army has acquired developmental, training and operational experience on which to base the development and employment of improved surface-launched missile systems which conform to Army requirements and missions. Surface-to-surface and surface-to-air units have been organized under approved tables of organization and equipment, have been trained and have been assigned operational missions in the active Army. And, like Artillery, the Army has a need for several types corresponding to the target system which it must strike.

First, the *short-range* weapons which include assault or demolition guided missiles for use against enemy armor and fortifications. The new DART and LACROSSE are examples of this category.

Second, we have the *medium-range* missiles, designed to provide close fire support for our combat units. They are needed also to compensate for the expanding dimensions of future battle areas. The CORPORAL, SERGEANT, and REDSTONE missiles are in this category. A few years ago the Army started work on REDSTONE. The project has met with unusual success. Its achievement in flight tests is unequalled in missile development history. When completed, the Army will have an all-weather, around-the-clock weapon that can reach deep into enemy territory. REDSTONE combat units are now being trained for operational employment.

Last, the *long-range* missiles which we visualize as supporting deep penetrations or distant airheads from widely dispersed rear areas.

Regardless of the military Service firing such missiles, they will be used against distant targets of vital interest to the Army. An example of this type is the JUPITER IRBM which the Army is developing but which will be employed by the Air Force. Meanwhile the Army has been directed to submit a program for the development of a missile in range between the REDSTONE and JUPITER missiles.

As to missiles for the destruction of aircraft, most persons are familiar with the Army's NIKE-AJAX, located about our major cities as a vital part of our continental defense. Here is a weapon that is a reality, ready to fire in defense of our skies. These missiles and the men employing them are a reminder to an aggressor of the losses their bombers may expect to suffer if they are rash enough to attack us.

NIKE-AJAX can operate effectively against every current type of aircraft regardless of height or speed. But to counter the airplane of the immediate future another member of this missile family, the NIKE-HERCULES, is being added to our defense. Armed with an atomic warhead and with greater range and altitude capacity, the HERCULES will be able to destroy whole formations of hostile bombers.

In the light of recent events, we are becoming increasingly impressed with the need to press forward in the development of the antimissile missile. The Army project in this field is another member of the NIKE family, the ZEUS. All of our efforts in this field have been crowned with success appropriate to the stage of the program. We see no reason why the country cannot have an antimissile missile defense for a price which is within reach. We can have an antimissile missile defense and indeed we must have one if we are to retain our nuclear retaliatory deterrent capability, which is indispensable to the prevention of general atomic war. We cannot afford to face at some future time an enemy armed with an ICBM and a strong surface-to-air missile defense without reinforcing our own offensive capability with a reasonable level of defense against the ICBM.

Another Army missile which must be brought forward rapidly is the HAWK. This is the missile which in combination with NIKE ZEUS offers an acceptable level of protection against air attack. The HAWK specializes in the attack of low flying targets and is the only missile presently under development which can deal with this threat.

To insure effective response to the air defense and fire support requirements of Army force commanders, the foregoing Army missile units are employed in general consonance with the accepted principles of artillery fire support as modified by the special characteristics of the missile units. The artillery commander at each echelon

is responsible to his immediate Army force commander for command and control and for basic recommendations concerning the employment of Army missile units.

In the employment of its missile units, the Army has found that its organization is readily adaptable to the support of surface-launched missile operations of all kinds. Found within its structure are most of the elements which will be needed to reconnoiter and survey missile sites, move the missiles to these sites, camouflage their positions and defend them from hostile interference. All of these supporting operations are required and the Army now has units already in its organic structure to perform them. Let us amplify this point.

The ability to locate, occupy and support constantly shifting missile sites in remote mountain, jungle or forest areas requires an extremely flexible supporting organization. The Army possesses sufficient land transport, sufficiently mobile supply, ordnance and medical echelons to support mobile or remotely dispersed missile units over large land distances.

The Army's Engineer organization is well equipped to perform the necessary protective construction work at missile sites as well as the maintenance of routes to those sites. Perhaps most importantly, the Engineers possess the capability for basic location survey on which the accuracy and, therefore, the ultimate usefulness of the missile so largely depends.

In order to command and control widely dispersed missile units, a requirement for mobile and highly reliable electronic communications is apparent. The kind of communications required is precisely that which the Army has already developed to a high degree of efficiency for the support of its fast-moving battle groups.

It is likely that under certain conditions missile sites may be subjected to either guerrilla or airborne attack. The requirement for locating launching sites in remote areas where cover, concealment and deception will be facilitated will expose these sites to partisan interference. Therefore, some form of ground protection must be provided locally. The Army obviously is ready to provide ground protection at weapons sites. There will also be a requirement for anti-aircraft protection, probably by mobile surface-to-air missile units. The Army has a defense capability in its mobile surface-to-air missiles which can be coupled with the surface-to-surface missile units for protection against air attack. Lastly, the over-all security of the missile units depends on the ability of the Army forces to hold the general area in which the missile forces operate. The accomplishment of this is a fundamental Army capability.

Thus we have seen that the Army, in discharging its responsibility for surface-launched missiles in support of land operations, has developed several types of missile units which correspond to the target system which must be engaged. We have noted that the Army's concept of employment of these units calls for them to operate in consonance with the accepted principles of artillery fire support. Finally, we have reminded ourselves that the Army has found its organization to be readily adaptable to the support of surface-launched missile operations of all kinds.

## SECTION XII

### THE ARMY AVIATION PROGRAM OF THE FUTURE

There are two main aspects to the Army Aviation program as it will develop in the future. One aspect of the program involves the use of aircraft for command, observation and short hauls of personnel and freight. For the foreseeable future this part of the program will involve aircraft of the current types in which the Army is interested. The difference between Army aircraft and those of interest to the Air Force is that Army aircraft must be able to operate from unprepared fields and they must live and operate in the austere and rugged environment of the fighting soldier.

These aircraft will probably always be designed for short hauls and for flight close to the ground. In all probability, their speeds will remain in sub-sonic ranges. Such airplanes hold little interest for the U. S. Air Force.

The other direction in which Army Aviation must inevitably move is in the direction of new and novel flying vehicles which will probably be very much different in appearance from the conventional types we know today. They have been described as ground vehicles which do not leave footprints. These vehicles, flying a few feet above the ground—darting down valleys and ravines, hovering behind woods and hills, and scurrying around and behind enemy forces suggest the shape of things to come.

The basic dilemma facing all military forces—ours and the Soviet's alike—arises out of the fact that our ability to deliver nuclear firepower has outstripped our efforts to reduce our own vulnerability to those same nuclear fires. In fact, we can never reduce our vulnerability to atomic fires to a satisfactory extent without a decisive jump in mobility.

We seem to have gone just about as far as we can go in the search for mobility through improved ground vehicles. There will be improvements in the future, of course, in range, flotation, combat worthiness and armament. However, none of these improvements in ground vehicles will overcome the traditional barriers of terrain to the extent that they must be overcome if we are to take the large step forward

required by nuclear warfare. We must look for aerial vehicles which can move across the terrain at 60 or 70 miles an hour, whether that terrain consists of mountains, jungles, swamps, rivers or plains. This is the direction in which Army Aviation must lead which, it is reiterated, is not in the direction of another Air Force.



## SECTION XIII

### THE ARMY BUDGET

Few responsible people will argue against the need for a stable military policy, but few know where to look to verify that we have one. We are inclined to seek our military policy in patriotic slogans like "millions for defense but not one cent for tribute," or "Walk softly but carry a big stick", without going to basic sources to find out what our policy really is. Among these basic sources is a ponderous document, dull reading to the average citizen, but most important: the military budget. Our over-all military policy is no more stable than the consistency of the financial support reflected in these budgets which provide the means that give reality to our military program. In a sense, through the budget we rewrite our military policy once a year, and it is highly important that there is continuity of theme from one annual version to the next.

However, we are living in a period of rapid change insofar as the requirements of defense are concerned. All of the Services are faced with common problems resulting from several conflicting requirements which they perceive in preparing themselves to meet the conditions of future conflict. Generally speaking, we are faced with achieving a number of balances between the conflicting forces which are brought to play upon our financial programs.

The first of these forces is the impact of technology upon our weapons systems. The very successes of technology in providing us with improved weapons of great power create concomitant problems involving the use of our financial resources. The Army recognizes that it must constantly press forward in the field of research and development in order to assure that our Army forces will always have the best possible weapons in the case of a future conflict. But technology is being so successful that it raises a series of questions as to which of these new and modern weapons we really must have since the total bill for all of them would exceed any budget which we are likely to obtain.

Furthermore, the decision with regard to our weapons is complicated by the uncertainty as to the precise form of future conflict. This doubt affects especially the question of the use of atomic weapons. The Army feels that it must have the capability of using these weap-

ons as required, in the light of the decision of our responsible leaders. At the same time, we are equally certain that we could never afford to be dependent exclusively on atomic weapons, so that we must always retain a sufficient arsenal of so-called conventional weapons to give us the flexibility of application which is indispensable if the Army is to be a proper instrument of national policy. So these questions involving the rate of modernization and the direction of modernization have serious consequences upon our budget decisions.

Not only must the Army keep modern in its weapons, but it must constantly attract to it better people. The need for better people—or perhaps better expressed as more highly trained people with appropriate skills and specialities—arises from the nature and complexities of our modern weapons systems. All of the Services are equally affected by this problem. Hence, in our budget we must give due recognition to Service incentives and career attractions. Not only must we draw better people to us—men and women capable of absorbing the training and acquiring the necessary skills to meet our requirements—but also once they have entered the Army, they must be willing to stay. Consequently, career stability must receive attention as we allocate our financial means.

Let us turn now to the general philosophy which guides the Army as it undertakes to solve some of the problems to which reference has been made. In brief, the Army sets for itself the objective of applying its funds to develop a maximum capability to deter war. We are thinking more and more in terms of deterrent capabilities and are trying to identify those components of the Army most essential as contributions toward deterrent power. Only after assuring a maximum contribution to the deterrence of general and limited war are we justified in allocating our remaining means to hedge against the failure of deterrence. In sum, the Army spends its money to buy deterrence.

In buying this deterrence the Army budgets for the five components with which it contributes to the deterrent posture. These components are: the overseas deployments which we have in Europe and in the Far East; the divisions at home which comprise the Strategic Army Force; the anti-aircraft elements of the Army which contribute to the continental defense of the U. S.; the Army's reserve components, the National Guard and the Army Reserve; and the aid which the Army gives to allied army forces. From its total budget the Army allots the means to support these various categories of forces.

In constructing the FY 1958 budget, when the Army had finished allocating the resources in dollars and in manpower to the categories of deterrent Army forces, it found that it could identify 58 percent of its dollars and 67 percent of its manpower as directly supporting its

deterrent forces. The remainder of the Army budget and the remainder of its personnel were to be found in the supporting base in the United States. This base includes the training system, the logistical system, our research and development organization, and the command and administrative structure which are indispensable to the conduct of this vast enterprise. Each year we analyze the composition of this support base to verify that we are not wasting our funds in places which are not remunerative. It appears that the present balance between direct deterrent forces and the support organization therefor is about right. Any further reduction of the latter category of forces would inevitably be reflected in a weakening of the combat potential of our essential deterrent forces.

There should be stability in the financial support given our military policy as we allocate means to deterrent forces from year to year if this policy is to reflect stability. However, if this financial stability is taken to mean a fixed budget ceiling, this too can lead to difficulties, as all Services are discovering. Today, we are required to meet our military needs under such a fixed budget-ceiling—that is we are told that our government will not spend more money on the Department of Defense in the future than in FY 1958. This requirement to live under a fixed ceiling would not be difficult, if we had no expanding programs. However, the facts are that the requirements of our budget are not static. At least two of our major programs are growing and hence require more dollars. The first of these is continental air defense, for which each year we are being forced to allocate more of our resources. Another expanding program difficult to control is that of the reserve forces. We have had great success in attracting volunteers to the six months program, but this very success has created greater dollar requirements, not only for the pay of personnel but also in the provision of equipment and training facilities. Also, the cost of our modern weapons is mounting. Prices are upward because of the general inflationary trend, and we foresee, too, the need for pay increases in order to retain our highly skilled people. All of these factors will make it very difficult to live under a fixed ceiling budget.

If we are to live within these financial limits we must, as a Service, learn how to put "first things first" and be sure that we spend our dollars on those elements of our structure which contribute directly to the deterrence of war and our effectiveness on the battlefield. Although progress is being made in this direction, there is still much to be done. Keeping a critical eye constantly upon all the operations to verify that they are being conducted economically and efficiently, and that they can be related to the combat-readiness of our Army to discharge its roles and missions are not problems reserved to the Comptroller; they are shared by every commander and staff officer in the Army today.

## SECTION XIV

### ARMY MANAGEMENT\*

From a scientific point of view, this is the era of atomic power and supersonic speed. From a military point of view, this is the era of increased firepower, mobility and flexibility. From an industrial point of view, this is the era of improved management. The role of good management in the United States Army has become of increasing importance in supporting the Army's mission of providing for national security.

Prior to World War II each Army post, camp and station had a distinct individuality generally reflecting that of the commanding officer. In these enclaves there were almost as many standards of management as there were posts. The day is past when such diversity in management procedures is acceptable. There is room for only one standard of management—the most efficient and best.

Numbering nearly a million soldiers and over 400,000 civilians directly associated with it, the Army is a great fighting organization and at the same time, a great administrative organization. The two cannot be separated because they are a unit of effort. The Army administrator in his office contributes directly to the success of the fighting leader in the field who, in turn, must administer intelligently and efficiently the combat unit which he commands.

As applied to the Army to describe its administration operations, the term "Big Business" is not an exaggeration. Many people like to compare the size of the Army with the size of private corporations, although obviously the two are not entirely comparable. The purpose of a business is to produce profits; whereas the Army's purpose is to produce security, a product which cannot be measured in dollars and cents. Yet to carry out its mission, the Army is necessarily one of the world's largest organizations conducting business-type operations.

The size of the Army and its deployment throughout the world create management problems that did not exist prior to World War II when military forces were smaller. Weapons, ammunition, vehi-

---

\*From an article by General Maxwell D. Taylor, "The Army's Era of Management", in ARMED FORCES MANAGEMENT, October, 1956.

cles and other equipment are much more costly today than before. The new weapons and equipment add new possibilities to the strategic and tactical employment of Army forces but also add increased costs to Army budgets. To pay these bills, the Army must hold down administrative costs. To this end, we look to improved management to assure that not a dollar is wasted or diverted from our primary purpose of having a combat-ready Army.

The conduct of Army business is a challenge to our leaders. To do their jobs, they must have considerable knowledge of science, finance, engineering and business methods. They need to keep abreast of the latest techniques in many fields of management. Some of these techniques are readily available for adoption from the civilian world; others peculiar to military requirements must be devised within the Army itself.

There is constant activity in the Army to improve its business procedures. To cite a few examples, I would mention the following: management appraisal surveys of selected organizations, such as depots, Technical Services and installations to include small elements, such as motor pools and processing points for personnel; studies of major functions such as procurement, storage, issue and reclamation; reviews of administrative procedures, such as the volume and flow of paper work; and surveys of the utilization of manpower, material and facilities. The Incentive Awards Program stimulates improvement in various areas by offering incentives to new ideas and by helping to instill the need for improvement and cost consciousness in the minds of all Army personnel, both civilian and military. Almost 62,000 separate suggestions were submitted during a recent fiscal year which benefited the Army by over \$20 million during one year.

In the Army, as in any other large organization, efficiency depends to a large degree upon the ability to identify and reward deserving personnel. For several years the Army has been developing a method for measuring the work performed in non-tactical operations under the name of Performance Analysis. By this procedure, we undertake to determine the productivity of manpower by relating the time expended in doing a piece of work to the number of man hours which should have been spent according to an established standard. Thus it is possible to determine a relationship between individual and ideal performance. This approach gives a way of measuring the effectiveness of individuals and their relative contributions to the attainment of the job objective. Thus, the ideal standard established by the system becomes a sort of par for the execution of the work and provides an incentive to the workmen to reach that par.

The Army gives recognition in its school system to the need for better trained military and civilian managers. Courses have been incorporated emphasizing general management, management engineering and financial management.

Under the training program for general management, the Army school system provides officer courses on present-day concepts of management and upon new developments in administration. These management subjects are given progressively increased emphasis as officer students advance through the various echelons of the school system. Whereas in the past, the school curricula included almost exclusively tactical instruction, now they give due recognition to the fact that an officer spends perhaps half of his time in non-tactical installations in positions requiring a business type of training.

At the top of the management training program in the school system is the Command Management School at Fort Belvoir which gives senior officers and key civilians advanced training in this field. The course lasts for three weeks and each year accommodates about ten classes of 50 students each.

The Army also utilizes the civilian school system to supplement instruction in general management. It sends officers to special management courses such as those at Harvard and Pittsburgh Universities. Here our officers exchange experiences with their counterparts in private industry to the mutual benefit of soldier and civilian. Through these mutually beneficial contacts, the Army has access to the best management concepts and practices in the civilian world.

The Army has a mounting requirement for technicians who specialize in various aspects of management. In order to develop individuals of this sort, the Ordnance Corps operates a Management and Industrial Engineering School at Rock Island Arsenal. This valuable institution is available to train personnel drawn from the entire Army. It provides a series of short, intensive courses in various analytical and control techniques which are needed by the engineers and operators of the industrial type activities of the Army. To date thousands of students have completed these courses which range from management seminars to studies of work planning and control.

Excess paper work has always been a plague in the Army and the bane of the junior officer. Effective steps are being taken to reduce the volume of paper work wherever found. As a result, the Second Hoover Commission's Task Force on Paper Work Management noted that the Army had less paper work on a per capita basis than many large private companies. By rigidly restricting the creation of new reports, by improving the design of forms, by expediting the disposition of records, and by reducing the over-all number of documents

printed it is possible to make continuous progress in this fight against excess paper work.

Among the important Army management programs, the Army Program System adopted in 1950 deserves particular attention. This system provides a method for directing and administering the Army's varied activities which are grouped into functional areas called Programs. This is the Army's method of telling widely dispersed commanders what to do and how to do it. In addition, the Programs provide guidance as to the necessary men, money and materiel needed to accomplish assigned tasks.

As in the case of big industry, the first step in Army programming is a determination of over-all objectives in functional fields such as personnel, materiel and facilities. Then, specific objectives are established and published in program documents along with the necessary supporting policies and schedules. In turn, the operating agency, such as an overseas command or a technical service, prepares more detailed plans in support of those emanating from higher authority.

The Program System operates at all levels of command. At the Department of Army level are the over-all programs of work to be accomplished by the entire Army. Throughout the chain of command, each command receives guidance from the next higher echelon in formulating its own plan of operation. In this way the entire Army is tied together with common, planned objectives, each organization carrying out its portion of the total effort.

Planning and executing a program are two management steps which are obviously necessary to accomplish objectives or missions. However, it is also imperative to review and analyze the progress being made in carrying out the plans, so that we may know not only where we have been, but also where we are going, and how well we are doing. Much as an industry continually studies trends in sales and adjusts its production to them, the Army constantly reviews its programming in the light of changing world conditions, manpower ceilings and other factors that might require a modification of the Programs. By such a periodic review and analysis we gauge our progress, maintain synchronization of operations, and set new goals when necessary.

Within the last few years, the Army has also developed a financial management plan to assist management both at the departmental level and at subordinate command levels. It consists of six elements: cost of performance budget, financial property accounting, stock funds, consumer funds, integrated accounting, and internal audit. A major goal is the development of the cost of performance budget,

whose successful development and use depends on many of the other elements. Such a budget will enable a commander to forecast his need for resources by applying the costs of doing the work. Under the old plan, the commander was given, not the money, but free issue of supplies. Now, if he is to live within his cost budget, the local commander must spend his money wisely and only for those items which are essential to accomplish his mission. The value of this new system is that, by giving the consumer—that is the local commander—money, and by requiring him to purchase his supplies with that money, he will be in a position to exercise more careful accounting of the financial value of resources required to carry out his mission.

The various elements of the Financial Management Plan have been tied together in a single operating system, called the Army Command Management System. There are two aspects of this system, one for Class I activities, and the other for depots. The Class I Command Management System is a systematic procedure for relating financial operations to the installation's programs from their inception, and also for concurrently evaluating performance in financial terms. It provides the commander and his staff with operating statements which reveal actual budget costs compared with original budget estimates, the manpower used compared with original estimates, and the effectiveness of the performance of personnel.

The Depot Command Management System applies to depots the same general objectives as the Class I Command Management System. Present plans for Army-wide use of the Command Management System are well advanced throughout the continental United States.

Men, Money, and Materiel have been the traditional "Ms" in our logistical equation. But the complexity and extent of our logistical activities are such that we must impose the fourth "M"—Management—on our operations to produce a combat-ready Army. No other military Service has forces deployed so widely about the globe as does the U. S. Army. In consequence, our management personnel must plan and operate against unusual time and space factors. The Army logistical staff must not only provide a large volume of supplies to its using units, but must also seek to simplify logistical operations, increase operational effectiveness, and decrease costs.

Logistics management involves more than the procurement and distribution of supplies. It involves the use of people as well. The proper handling of manpower is more essential to over-all success than the handling of supplies. The efficient management of nearly one million men requires the highest order of leadership to derive the maximum contribution from their aptitudes and potentialities. They must be properly selected, assigned, and trained. The effective



must be recognized and rewarded, the ineffective identified and retrained or replaced. Directing these operations we need able professional leaders.

Good management is, indeed, merely one expression of good leadership. Today, the good commander must also be the good manager. In many ways, it is more difficult to provide effective leadership in the management field, than in the tactical field, but it is as essential in the office as on the battlefield. It is the purpose of the Army to develop leaders in management who will display in our offices, shops and depots the universal qualities of leadership: professional competence, human understanding and personal integrity. With such men in charge of Army business, there can be no question about the effective use of the national resources made available to the Army.

## SECTION XV

### THE CIVILIAN AND THE SERVICEMAN

A question which often arises in the minds of thinking American civilians is: What can I, as a United States citizen, do to assist the Armed Forces in discharging their mission of maintaining the peace? It would seem that this pertinent question might be answered as follows.

First and foremost, all citizens should take a deep, personal interest in the Armed Forces. We in the Army are sometimes concerned by the reluctance with which our young men view the discharge of their military obligations. Those who enter our ranks are often difficult to retain beyond the minimum period of required service. We particularly regret to lose the talented ones who, after receiving extensive training at public expense, leave us at the height of their usefulness to return to civil life. When the trend appears it is a matter of deep concern to those who are charged with the responsibility for the defense of the Nation. If citizens will take an interest in the members of their Armed Forces, visit them and talk to their members, this attention will convince the servicemen that they are doing a job that really matters. A sense of mission is as important in maintaining morale and stability among service personnel as is the financial advantages derived from the monthly paycheck. The latter cannot be too small. The Armed Forces cannot be starved and expected to retain their strength, their enthusiasm, and their self-respect. But above all, they must be understood; they must be appreciated.

It should not be difficult to develop an enthusiasm for our Armed Forces if a good look is taken at the record. Strangely enough, although we Americans are inclined to boast of the highest skyscrapers, the deepest canyons, the broadest rivers and the most automobiles, we are slow in proclaiming the achievements of American arms, which are among the most glorious in the history of the world.

But our forces do not live on their past record alone. They are doing a job today that merits interest and attention. Citizens should visit our Army camps where we are training recruits to be fighting men; they should go to the airfields and see the pride of the Air

Force. Calls should be made on our Naval stations to observe the evidence of American seapower. If some of these things are done, the citizen is sure to develop that interest in the Armed Forces which, in the long run, will reverberate through the ranks of servicemen to the development of strength, confidence and esprit de corps. If they are made to feel that they are doing an important job, the servicemen will always do it in an effective way.

Furthermore, as persons who see and understand the role of the Armed Forces, these citizens will help us in bringing young men of talent to our ranks. The Army, the Navy, the Marines and the Air Force will never be any better than the quality of the young men who compose them. The final and decisive element in all aspects of warfare is not the weapon, it is not the equipment, it is the man who maintains and uses the hardware. The strength of the Army in the past has always been in the depth of the talent within its officer and noncommissioned officer corps. Although each year we lose some of the famous names known to all the Nation, behind these men who retire or who leave the ranks there has always been a new generation of young leaders coming forward, officers trained in the Army School system, veterans of one or more wars, with broad practical experience and thorough professional training, capable of filling the gaps. This situation must never be allowed to lapse. This year the young men who are entering West Point and the Reserve Officer Training Corps of our colleges represent the leaders who must be ready for heavy responsibilities two decades hence. Let us be sure that this generation contributes an adequate increment to maintaining that long line of ability in the officer corps of our Armed Forces.

Finally, if, as has been suggested, our citizens will look at the Armed Forces, visit them, develop an interest in them to the point that they are willing to contribute some of the best men to the military profession, then they, too, will gain by playing a part in this vital role of protecting our Nation. It may even be that it will be less painful to pay those heavy taxes which represent the financial support of our costly military program. But, in any event, they will join a most important team—the security team of the United States. Along with the Armed Forces, these informed civilians will contribute to that impression of over-all power capable of giving pause to and enemy: strength in being which is the only guarantee of our national security and the peace of the world.

[AG 381 (17 Jan 58)]

By Order of *Wilber M. Brucker*, Secretary of the Army :

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR,  
*General, United States Army,*  
*Chief of Staff.*

Official :

HERBERT M. JONES,  
*Major General, United States Army,*  
*The Adjutant General.*

Distribution :

*Active Army:* D Plus USMA ; USAWC ; Joint Colleges ; Br Svc Sch.

To be distributed on a need-to-know basis to Headquarters, Department of the Army Agencies ; US Continental Army Command ; Headquarters, USA Air Defense Commands ; Army Headquarters ; and Headquarters of Major Oversea Commands and as indicated.

*NG:* State AG.

*USAR:* None.